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This paper concerns optimal income taxation and provision of a state-variable public 
good under asymmetric information in a two-type overlapping generations model, 
where people care about their relative consumption. Each individual may compare 
his/her own current consumption with his/her own past consumption as well as with 
other people’s current and past consumption. The appearance of positional concerns 
affects the policy choices via two channels: (i) the size of the average degree of 
positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the (mimicked) low-ability 
type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor 
income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal 
capital income tax rate of the low-ability type becomes substantially smaller, 
compared to the conventional optimal income tax model. The extent by which the rule 
for public provision should be modified depends crucially on the preference elicitation 
format. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the late 1970s, literature dealing with public policy in economies where the 
consumers have positional preferences, i.e. relative consumption concerns, has 
gradually developed.
1 The importance of this literature has become more apparent 
over time, as corresponding empirical literature has grown. There is by now 
convincing empirical support for the idea that relative consumption comparisons are 
important from at least three independent economic sub-literatures: happiness 
research (e.g. Easterlin 2001; Blanchflower and Oswald 2005; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
2005; Luttmer 2005), questionnaire-based experiments
2 (e.g. Johansson-Stenman et 
al. 2002; Solnick and Hemenway 2005; Carlsson et al. 2007), and more recently from 
brain science (Fliessbach et al. 2007). There are also recent evolutionary models 
consistent with relative consumption concerns (Samuelson 2004; Rayo and Becker 
2007). According to Rayo and Becker, selfish genes would prefer that the humans 
they belong to were motivated by their own current consumption relative to (i) their 
own past consumption, (ii) other people’s current consumption, and (iii) other 
people’s past consumption. The present paper takes these three types of consumption 
comparisons as a point of departure in a study of optimal income taxation and 
provision of public goods in a dynamic economy. 
 
Earlier studies on optimal taxation and public good provision in economies where 
people make relative consumption comparisons often assume that the government 
uses linear tax instruments. Furthermore, almost all of them are based on static 
models, and have in common that they neglect capital income taxation. By relying on 
static models, earlier literature also neglects that the consumption comparisons may 
                                                 
1 Earlier studies address a variety of issues such as optimal taxation, public good provision, social 
insurance, growth, environmental externalities, and stabilization policy; see e.g. Boskin and Sheshinski 
(1978), Layard (1980), Ng (1987), Tuomala (1990), Blomquist (1993), Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 
2001), Ireland (2001), Brekke and Howarth (2002), Abel (2005), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(2008) and Wendner and Goulder (in press). Clark et al. (2008) provide a good overview of both the 
empirical evidence and economic implications of relative consumption concerns. 
2 There are also experimental results from the social preference literature suggesting that people dislike 
inequity generally and disadvantageous inequity in particular, which can be interpreted as concern 
about the relative outcome; see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockefels (2000).    3
have an intertemporal dimension. In the present paper, we consider an overlapping 
generations (OLG) model with two ability-types and asymmetric information between 
the private sector and the government (an extension of the two-type optimal income 
tax model developed by Stern 1982 and Stiglitz 1982). The set of policy instruments 
consists of nonlinear taxes on labor income and capital income as well as a state-
variable public good. Therefore, the tax instruments considered here are based on 
informational limitations and not on any other a priori restrictions. The overall 
purpose is to analyze how the appearance of positional preferences modifies the 
optimal income tax structure and public good provision, respectively, by comparison 
with the outcome of the standard two-type OLG model where people only care about 
their absolute consumption levels. 
 
Only a few earlier studies have dealt with optimal nonlinear taxation in economies 
where people have positional preferences. To our knowledge, the first was a paper by 
Oswald (1983), who assumes a continuous ability-distribution and that each 
individual compares his/her own consumption with a reference point; the latter is 
interpretable as reflecting either jealousy or altruism. Oswald shows that allowing for 
jealousy/altruism affects the optimal tax structure in a complex way, and that several 
standard results of optimal tax theory (such as zero marginal tax rates at the ends of 
the skill-distribution and that differentiated commodity taxes should not be used with 
certain forms of separable preferences) may no longer apply. Furthermore, the results 
show that if the utility function is separable in the measure of reference consumption, 
then the marginal tax rates are higher in an economy with predominantly jealous 
people and lower in an economy with predominately altruistic people, compared with 
the standard model without social interaction. Tuomala (1990) uses a similar model, 
where the utility of each individual depends negatively on the average consumption of 
others, and generalizes some findings by Oswald beyond additive separability. In 
addition, he provides numerical simulations showing, for instance, that the optimal 
marginal tax rates may be substantially higher when taking positional concerns into 
account. Ireland (2001) also uses a model with a continuous ability-distribution and 
nonlinear taxation of labor income. He assumes that individuals signal their social 
status position which, in turn, necessitates using resources that could otherwise have 
been used for beneficial consumption. This constitutes an incentive for the 
government to intervene, meaning (again) that social interaction justifies the use of   4
distortionary taxation. Finally, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) analyze a 
two-type model in which agents value their own consumption both in absolute terms 
and relative to a measure of reference consumption (the average consumption in the 
economy as a whole). The results show, among other things, how the redistributive 
and corrective roles of income taxation may interact, due to possible differences 
between agents with respect to the degree of positionality, as well as how positional 
preferences affect the optimal provision of public goods in an economy where the 
income tax is optimally chosen. 
 
The present paper is also related to a small – yet growing – literature dealing with 
redistribution and/or provision of public goods under asymmetric information in 
dynamic economies. The seminal contribution here is a paper by Ordover and Phelps 
(1979). In a model with a continuum of ability-types, they show (among other things) 
that if leisure is separable from private consumption in terms of the utility function (so 
the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption does not 
depend on the leisure choice other than via income), then the marginal capital income 
tax rate should be zero for each ability-type. Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), in a 
generalization of the model in Brett (1997), consider an OLG model with two ability-
types and endogenous before-tax wage rates. Their results show that production 
inefficiency at the second best optimum (which is a consequence of the desire to relax 
the self-selection constraint) justifies capital income taxation, whereas the marginal 
labor income tax rates take the same general form as in Stiglitz (1982), i.e. a positive 
marginal labor income tax rate should be imposed on the low-ability type and a 
negative marginal labor income tax rate on the high-ability type. They also derive the 
optimality condition for a public good, which is assumed to be a state variable. A 
somewhat related argument for using capital income taxation is found by Aronsson et 
al. (in press); they show that the appearance of equilibrium unemployment may justify 
capital income taxation, as it implies intertemporal production inefficiency at the 
second-best optimum. Finally, Boadway et al. (2000) analyze nonlinear labor income 
taxation and proportional capital income taxation in a model where both ability and 
initial wealth are unobserved by the government. In their framework, the capital 
income tax is interpretable as an indirect instrument to tax wealth. 
   5
The present study makes at least three distinct contributions to the literature, all of 
which are related to the intertemporal aspects of the analysis. First, we are able to 
consider capital income taxation. As far as we know, the only previous study that 
analyzes capital income taxation under relative consumption concerns is Abel (2005). 
He considers optimal capital income taxation in an OLG model where all consumers 
of a given generation are identical, and where a linear capital income tax constitutes 
the only tax instrument.
3 The present paper, in contrast, analyzes the remaining role 
for capital income taxation when the labor income tax has been chosen in an optimal 
way. As earlier research indicates that the capital income tax might be a useful tool 
for relaxing the self-selection constraint, as noted above, a natural question is whether 
this tax is also useful for purposes of internalizing positional externalities. We show 
(for a special case) that under plausible empirical estimates regarding relative 
consumption concerns, the marginal capital income tax rate implemented for the low-
ability type may be substantially smaller in absolute value than would be predicted by 
a model without positional concerns. Moreover, we show that the well-known result 
of zero marginal capital income tax rates under leisure separability (Ordover and 
Phelps 1979) generalizes to our more general framework for a natural benchmark 
case. 
 
Second, our study addresses public good provision in an economy with positional 
preferences. As far as we know, there are only two earlier studies in this area: 
Wendner and Goulder (in press) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008). Both 
are based on static models, and the former also assumes linear tax instruments. Our 
contribution here is to address public good provision and positional preferences in a 
dynamic economy, where the public good is a state variable, i.e. a stock that 
accumulates over time both due to the instantaneous contributions and depreciation. 
This is both a theoretically relevant and practically important extension, not least 
because many environmental public goods have this particular character. The most 
obvious example is the global climate, where the quality of the atmosphere provides 
essential benefits to humanity. The quality observed at present is clearly not only 
affected by the actions taken today (such as the current public abatement activities); it 
                                                 
3 In Abel’s study, the tax revenues are returned lump-sum to the old generation. The model also 
contains a social security system (based on lump-sum payments) with its own budget.   6
is also affected by the actions taken in previous periods (cf. Stern 2007). Our results 
here depend crucially on the preference elicitation format. If people’s marginal 
willingness to pay for a public good is measured independently, i.e. without 
considering that other people also have to pay for increased public provision, then 
relative consumption concerns typically (for reasonable parameter values) work in the 
direction of increasing the optimal provision of the public good. However, this is not 
the case when a referendum format is used, so that people are asked for their marginal 
willingness to pay conditional on that all people will have to pay for increased public 
provision. Conditions are also presented for when a dynamic analogue of the 
conventional Samuelson rule applies.  
 
Third, the dynamic framework also allows us to simultaneously consider relative 
consumption comparisons between people (within the same period) and over time – 
an issue not dealt with in earlier comparable literature. In the first part of this paper, 
we focus on between-people comparisons at a given point in time and show (among 
other things) that important results carry over in a natural way from the static setup of 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008). For example, under plausible empirical 
parameter estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger 
compared to the conventional optimal income tax model. The same applies to the 
public good provision in the limiting case when the public good converges to a 
conventional flow variable. By adding consumption comparisons over time (while 
retaining the between-people comparisons within the same period), the policy rules 
become more complex. However, this additional complexity is due solely to the 
comparisons with the past consumption of others. If the only extension were to 
assume that people also compare their own current consumption with their own past 
consumption, then all results derived in the simpler framework with only between-
people comparisons in each period would continue to hold. Moreover, for the most 
general model we can for a natural benchmark case derive optimality conditions for 
the marginal labor income tax rates, the marginal capital income tax rates, and the 
public good, where the relative consumption concerns give rise to the same qualitative 
effects as they do in the simpler framework.  
 
The outline of the study is as follows: Section 2 presents the model and the outcome 
of private optimization based on a model where each individual compares his/her   7
consumption with the average consumption in that period. Section 3 characterizes the 
corresponding optimal tax and expenditure problem of the government, whereas 
Sections 4 presents the results in a format that aims to facilitate straightforward 
interpretations and comparisons with earlier literature. Section 5 presents the general 
model, which also encompasses comparisons with the individual’s own past 
consumption and the mean value of the past consumption of others. Section 6 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Positional preferences, firms, and market equilibrium 
 
2.1 The OLG framework and utility functions 
 
Consider an OLG model where each agent lives for two periods. Following the 
convention in earlier literature, we assume that each individual works during the first 
period of life and does not work during the second. There are two types of individuals, 
where the low-ability type (type 1) is less productive than the high-ability type (type 
2). The number of individuals of ability-type i who were born at the beginning of 
period t is denoted 
i
t n . Each such individual cares about his/her consumption when 
young and when old, 
i
t c  and  1
i
t x + ; his/her leisure when young, 
i
t z , given by a time 
endowment,  H , less the hours of work, 
i
t l  (when old, all available time is leisure); 
and the amount of the public good available when young and when old,  t G  and  1 t G + . 
 
In addition, as the agents are assumed to have positional preferences, they also 
compare their own consumption with a measure of reference consumption. We follow 
earlier comparable literature in assuming that the private consumption good (the 
consumption of which is denoted c when young and x when old) is in part a positional 
good, whereas leisure and the publicly provided good are completely non-positional.
4  
                                                 
4 As noted by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), it is of course possible to extend the analysis 
by allowing people to care about their relative amount of leisure and their relative benefit from a 
publicly provided good. We leave this to future research. Our conjecture is that the qualitative insights 
will still hold as long as private consumption is more positional than leisure and the publicly provided 
good, which is consistent with the limited empirical evidence (Solnick and Hemenway 1998, 2005; 
Carlsson et al. 2007).   8
 
The determinants of the relevant measure of reference consumption at the individual 
level constitute, of course, also an empirical question; yet, there is not much 
information available. Our approach is to follow the recent contribution by Rayo and 
Becker (2007), who argue in the context of an evolutionary model of happiness that 
the reference point of the individual might be determined by three components: (i) the 
individual’s own past consumption, (ii) other people’s current consumption, and (iii) 
other people’s past consumption. For pedagogical reasons, we start with a simpler 
model where each individual only compares his/her current consumption (when 
young and old, respectively) with other people’s current consumption, while we 
provide the full model in Section 5. As is demonstrated there, the results derived in 
the simpler model continue to hold for the case when each individual also compares 
his/her current consumption with his/her own past consumption. Moreover, for a 
special case, the results from the simpler model carry over in a natural sense to the 
most general model, which also contains comparisons with other people’s past 
consumption.  
 
The preferences for relative consumption, or positional preferences, can of course still 
be modeled in many different ways. Here we follow the approach chosen by many 
earlier studies by letting the relative consumption be described by the difference 
between the individual’s own consumption and the mean consumption in the economy 
as a whole, given by  t c  at time t; cf. e.g. Akerlof (1997), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), 
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Bowles and Park (2005), and Carlsson et al. (2007).
5 
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5 Alternative approaches include ratio comparisons (Boskin and Sheshinski 1978; Layard 1980; Abel 
2005; Wendner and Goulder, in press) and comparisons of the ordinal rank (Frank 1985; Hopkins and 
Kornienko 2004). Dupor and Liu (2003) consider a specific flexible functional form that includes the 
difference comparison and ratio comparison approaches as special cases. 
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The public good is a state variable governed by the difference equation 
 
  1 (1 ) tt t Gg G ξ − =+ − ,     (2) 
 
where  t g  is the addition provided by the government to the public good in period t 
and ξ  is the rate of depreciation. Therefore, the traditional flow-variable public good 
appears as the special case where  1 ξ = . 
 
The utility function  ()
i
t v ⋅  is increasing in each argument, implying that  ( )
i
t u ⋅  is 
decreasing in  t c and  1 t c +  (a property denoted “jealousy” by Dupor and Liu 2003) and 
increasing in the other arguments. Both  ()
i
t v ⋅  and  ()
i
t u ⋅  are assumed to be twice 
continuously differentiable in their respective arguments and strictly quasi-concave. 
The reference consumption levels in periods t and t+1 are measured by the average 
consumption among all people alive: 
 
1 1 2 2 11 22
11 tt tt t t t t
t
t




= ,     (3) 
11 22 1 1 2 2
11 11 1 1
1
1
tt tt t t t t
t
t
nc nc n x n x
c
N








11 tttt t Nnnn n −− =++ +  and 
12 1 2
111 tttt t Nnnn n +++ = ++ + . This means that each 
individual compares his/her own consumption with the average consumption in each 
period. We also assume that each individual treats the reference levels,  t c  and  1 t c + , as 
exogenous. 
 
The utility function in equation (1) is quite general and may vary both between 
ability-types and over time, and is furthermore not necessarily time-separable, 
meaning for example that the marginal rate of substitution between relative and 
absolute consumption when old is not necessarily independent of the consumption 
level when young. Thus, the model is flexible enough to encompass habit formation in 
private consumption. We will perform much of the analysis with the more general   10
utility formulation given by the second line of equation (1). This case resembles a 
classical externality problem e.g. in terms of pollution associated with private 
consumption. However, we will need the formulation on the first line when we relate 
the optimum tax and expenditure conditions to the extent that people care about 
relative consumption. The definition of such measures is the issue to which we turn 
next. 
 
2.2 The degree of consumption positionality 
 
Since much of the subsequent analysis is focused on relative consumption concerns, it 
is useful to introduce measures of the degree to which such concerns matter for each 
individual. By defining 
, ic i




ttt x c + + Δ= − , we can rewrite the first part 
of equation (1) as 
,,
11 (,, , , , , )
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We can then define the degree of consumption positionality (cf. e.g. Johansson-
Stenman et al. 2002; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 2008) when young and old, 
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where  , /
ii i
tc t t vv c ≡∂ ∂  and similarly for the other variables. The term 
, ic
t α  can then be 
interpreted as the fraction of the overall utility increase from the last dollar spent in 
period t that is due to the increased relative consumption. For instance, if 
, 0
ic
t α = , 
then relative consumption does not matter at all on the margin, whereas in the other 
extreme case where 
, 1
ic
t α = , absolute consumption does not matter at all (i.e. all that 
matters is relative consumption). The interpretation of
, ix
t α  is analogous except that 
this term reflects the degree of consumption positionality when old instead of when   11
young. From the assumptions about the utility functions, we have 
,, 0,1
ic ix
tt αα << . In 
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In other words,  t α  reflects the average value of the degree of consumption 
positionality among the people alive in period t.  
 
2.3 Individual optimization and market equilibrium 
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t s  is savings,  1 t r+  is the market interest rate, and  () t T ⋅  and  1() t+ Φ ⋅  denote the 
payments of labor income and capital income taxes, respectively. The first order 
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6 As our model does not make a distinction between different types of commodities, we abstract from 
commodity taxation throughout the paper. This approach has also been taken in most of the earlier 
comparable literature (see the introduction). This does not reflect a belief that commodity taxation is 
unimportant in connection to positional preferences. However, there are several practical problems 
associated with such extensions. For example, different variants of the same group of commodities, 
such as cars, may be characterized by very different degrees of positionality. Moreover, the theoretical 
analysis would become considerably more complex, suggesting that commodity taxation warrants a 
paper of its own.   12
in which  , /
ii i
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tz t t uu z =∂ ∂  and  ,1 /
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tx t t uu x + = ∂∂, and 
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tt t sr ++ Φ  are the marginal labor income tax rate and the marginal capital income tax 
rate, respectively. 
 
The production sector consists of identical competitive firms producing a 
homogenous good with constant returns to scale. Given these characteristics, the 
number of firms is not important and will be normalized to one for notational 
convenience. The production function is given by  ) , , (
2 1






t l n L =  is 
the total number of hours of work supplied by ability-type i in period t, and  t K  is the 
capital stock in period t. The firm obeys the necessary conditions 
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where subindices attached to the production function denote partial derivatives. 
 
3. The government’s decision problem 
 
3.1 Objective and constraints 
 
We assume that the government faces a general social welfare function as follows: 
     
 
11 2211 22
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which is increasing in each argument. Since the optimum conditions are expressed for 
any such social welfare function, they are necessary optimum conditions for a Pareto 
efficient allocation.
7 A similar formulation is used by Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), 
                                                 
7 All results obtained here that are independent of the social welfare function (i.e. basically all results 
that we comment on) could have been obtained by instead explicitly solving for the Pareto efficient 
allocation by maximizing the utility of one ability-type born in a certain period, while holding the 
utility constant for all other agents (the other ability-type born in the same period and both ability-types   13
although they in addition assume that the social welfare function is utilitarian within 
each generation. 
 
The informational assumptions are conventional. The government is able to observe 
income, although ability is private information. As in most of the earlier literature on 
the self-selection approach to optimal taxation, we assume that the government wants 
to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type.
8 This means that the most 
interesting aspect of self-selection is to prevent the high-ability type from pretending 
to be a low-ability type. The self-selection constraint that may bind then becomes 
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where 
2 1 / t t t w w = φ  is the wage ratio (relative wage rate) in period t. By using equation 
(10) for both ability-types, it is straightforward to show that  t φ  can be written as a 
function of 
1
t l , 
2
t l , and  t K , i.e. 
12 (, , ) tt t t llK φφ = . The expression on the right-hand side 
of the weak inequality in (13) is the utility of the mimicker. Although the mimicker 
enjoys the same consumption as the low-ability type in each period, he/she enjoys 
more leisure (as the mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type).
9 
 
Note that  ( ) t T ⋅  is a general labor income tax, which can be used to implement any 
desired combination of 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
2
t l , and 
2
t c , given the savings chosen by each ability-
type. Therefore, we will use 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
2
t l , and 
2
t c , instead of the parameters of the labor 
income tax function, as direct decision variables in the optimal tax and expenditure 
                                                                                                                                            
born in all other periods). The chosen strategy is motivated by convenience, as it simplifies the 
presentation. 
8 This of course implies restrictions on the social welfare function beyond what is stated above. 
9 Given the set of available policy instruments in our framework, it is possible for the government to 
control the present and future consumption as well as the hours of work of each ability-type (this is 
discussed more thoroughly below). As a consequence, in order to be a mimicker, the high-ability type 
must mimic the point chosen by the low-ability type on each tax function (both the labor income tax 
and the capital income tax), and thus consume equally much in both periods.  
      14
problem. Note also that the general capital income tax,  1() t+ Φ ⋅ , can be used to 
implement any desired combination of 
1
t c , 
1
1 t x + , 
2
t c , 
2
1 t x + , and  1 t K + , given the labor 
income of each individual. Therefore, instead of choosing the parameters of the 
capital income tax function directly, we formulate the optimization problem such that 
1
1 t x + , 
2
1 t x + , and  1 t K +  are also used as direct decision variables. The resource constraint 
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Equation (14) means that output is used for private consumption, net investments, and 
public consumption. 
 
Equations (2), (13), and (14) together constitute the set of restrictions facing the 
government. The Lagrangean is written as 
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For further use, let 
22 1 1 1
11 1 ˆ (, , ,, , , ) tt t t t t t tt t uu c H l x c c G G φ + ++ =− . As the decision-problem 
facing the government is written,
10 the direct decision-variables relevant for 
generation t are 
1
t l , 
1
t c , 
1
1 t x + , 
2
t l , 
2
t c , 
2
1 t x + ,  t K ,  1 t K + ,  t G ,  1 t G + , and  t g . The first-order 
conditions are presented in the appendix. 
                                                 
10 Note that there is a potential time inconsistency problem involved here since the government may 
have incentives to modify the second period taxation facing each generation once the individuals have 
revealed their true types. Although we acknowledge this potential problem, we follow earlier 
comparable literature by only considering situations where the government commits to its tax and 
expenditure policies. This approach is motivated by the observation that lack of commitment from the 
point of view of the government opens a spectrum of possibilities for modeling both public policy and 
the response by the private sector, which would be beyond the scope of this paper.   15
 
3.2 The positionality effect 
 
Let us now turn to the welfare effect of an increase in the reference consumption. The 
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We will refer to this derivative as measuring the positionality effect in period t, since 
it reflects the overall welfare effects of a change in the level of reference consumption 
in period t, ceteris paribus. By using the first utility formulation in equation (1), i.e. 
the function  ()
i
t v ⋅ , this effect can be rewritten in terms of the individual degrees of 
consumption positionality. Let us use the short notation 
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for the positionality differences between the mimicker and the low-ability type 
(measured for both generations alive in period t), where  0 t Γ >  ( 0 < ) if the mimicker 
is always, i.e. as both young and old, more (less) positional than the low-ability type. 
We can then derive the following result: 
 
Lemma 1. The welfare effect of increased reference consumption in period t can be 
written as 
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Therefore, increased reference consumption in period t reduces the welfare, so 
t £/ c 0 ∂∂<, if and only if  tt α Γ< . A sufficient condition for this to hold is that   16
1, 2, ˆ
cc
tt α α ≥  and 
1, 2, ˆ
x x
tt α α ≥ , meaning that the young and old low-ability type, 
respectively, is at least as positional as the corresponding mimicker in period t. 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Two mechanisms are worth noticing. First, in the absence of the self-selection 
constraint, i.e. if ability-type specific lump-sum taxes were possible to implement, an 
increase in the reference consumption would unambiguously decrease the welfare, 
since the reference consumption enters the utility function of each individual via the 
arguments 
, ic i




ttt x c + + Δ= − . Thus, the reference consumption 
constitutes a negative externality for each ability-type in each period. This explains 
the first term in the second row of equation (17), which relates the positionality effect 
to the average degree of positionality without any reference to differences in the 
degree of positionality between ability-types. Second, if the low-ability type is more 
positional than the mimicker in both generations alive in period t (i.e. generations t 
and t-1), then an increase in the reference consumption means a larger utility loss for 
the low-ability type than for the mimicker; as such, it contributes to an additional 
welfare loss via the self-selection constraint. However, if the mimicker is more 
positional than the low-ability type, then an increase in the reference consumption 
contributes to relax the self-selection constraint, implying that the second term in the 
second row of equation (17) is positive; this mechanism will be discussed in more 
detail subsequently. In this case, the sign of  t £/ c ∂ ∂  can be either positive or negative 
depending on whether or not  tt α Γ< . 
 
4. Tax and expenditure results 
 
In this section we present the optimality conditions for the marginal labor income tax 
rates, the marginal capital income tax rates, and the public good provision in a format 
that facilitates straightforward economic interpretations and comparisons with the 
benchmark case with no relative consumption concerns. 
 
4.1 Labor Income Taxation 
   17
By defining the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private consumption 













and similarly for the mimicker, we obtain the marginal labor income tax rate for the 
low-ability type by combining equations (8), (A1), and (A2), while the marginal labor 
income tax rate for the high-ability type is derived by combining equations (8), (A4), 
and (A5). We show in the appendix that 
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, ˆ / tt t c t u λ λγ = . The marginal labor income tax rates in equations (18) and (19) 
are straightforward extensions of the results in a static model with a linear production 
technology by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008). However, there are two 
important differences. First, the gross wage rates are endogenous here, meaning that 
the wage ratio responds to a change in the hours of work. Second, a change in the 
reference consumption in period t, induced by a change in the hours of work supplied 
by the young generation, will affect the well-being of both the young and the old 
generation in that period. 
 
The first part of each tax formula is analogous to results derived in earlier literature 
and is due to the self-selection constraint. With 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
zc zc MRS MRS >  (which applies if the 
preferences do not differ between ability-types), and if we assume (by analogy to 
earlier literature on optimal income taxation) that 
1 /0 tt l φ ∂ ∂<, the contribution of the 
self-selection constraint is to increase the marginal labor income tax rate of the low-
ability type. Similarly, if 
2 /0 tt l φ ∂∂ >  (also by analogy to earlier literature), the self-
selection constraint contributes to decrease the marginal labor income tax rate of the   18
high-ability type. These effects are well understood from earlier research (Stiglitz 
1982). 
 
The final part of each formula reflects the relative consumption concerns. By 
combining Lemma 1 with equations (18) and (19), we obtain the following result: 
 
Proposition 1.  If the young and old low-ability type, respectively, is at least as 
positional as the corresponding mimicker in period t, or if the positionality differences 
are sufficiently small so that  tt α Γ < , then the positionality effect contributes to 
increase the marginal labor income tax rate facing each ability-type in period t, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Note that the positionality effect discussed in Proposition 1 contains two parts: an 
externality-correcting component and a component that serves to relax the self-
selection constraint. To see this more clearly, we will combine equations (17), (18), 
and (19) in order to decompose the positionality effect. Let us use the short notations 
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t σ  and 
2
t σ  reflect the optimal marginal labor income tax rates without relative 
consumption concerns, i.e. the first term on the right-hand side of equation (18) and 
(19), respectively. We can then rewrite the formulas for the marginal labor income tax 
rates such that the contribution of positionality is decomposed into two effects as 
follows: 
 
Proposition 2. The optimal marginal labor income tax rate for each ability-type can 
be written in the following additive form (for i=1, 2): 
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.   (20) 
  
Proof: See Appendix.   19
 
Equation (20) is an intertemporal analogue to (and has the same general interpretation 
as) a corresponding tax formula derived by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) 
in a static model. Note first that in the special case where the resource allocation is 
first best, meaning that  0 t λ =  for all t, we have 
12 0 ttt σσ = =Γ = , so 
'1 1 '2 2 () ( ) tt t tt t t Tw l Tw l α == , which exemplifies a straightforward Pigouvian tax. The 
interpretation is that each individual is taxed for the negative positional externality 
that he/she imposes on other people.
11 
 
Returning to our more general second-best model, the intuition is straightforward. The 
first term on the right-hand side of equation (20) is the tax expression that would 
follow without any positional concern. The second term measures the marginal 
external cost of consumption – as reflected by the average degree of positionality – 
although its contribution to the marginal labor income tax rates is modified by 
comparison with the first-best. Increased private consumption, associated with an 
increase in the hours of work, causes negative external costs here as well; for the low-
ability type, however, these external costs are smaller than in the first-best provided 
that 
1 0 t σ >  (which is the case we discussed above). The intuition is that the fraction 
of an income increase that is already taxed away does not give rise to positional 
externalities. By analogy, if 
2 0 t σ < , then 
2 11 t σ − >  means that the government 
attaches a higher weight to the corrective part of the tax formula for the high-ability 
type than is does in the first-best. The reason is that the self-selection component in 
the formula for the high-ability type is a marginal subsidy, which strengthens the 
positional externality. 
 
The third term on the right-hand side of equation (20) reflects self-selection effects of 
positional concerns. Suppose first that  0 t Γ > , in which case the mimicker is more 
positional than the low-ability type. This means that increased reference consumption 
gives rise to a larger utility loss for the mimicker than it does for the low-ability type. 
Therefore, the government may relax the self-selection constraint by implementing 
                                                 
11 This special case also resembles the consumption tax derived by Dupor and Liu (2003) in a 
representative-agent model.   20
policies that lead to increased reference consumption. This provides an incentive for 
the government to implement a lower marginal labor income tax rate than it would 
otherwise have done, which means that the third term contributes to decrease the 
marginal labor income tax rate. Consequently, if  t Γ  is positive and sufficiently large, 
then this effect may (at least theoretically) dominate the externality-correcting 
component, implying that relative consumption concerns contribute to reduce the 
marginal labor income tax rates. If on the other hand  0 t Γ < , then the opposite 
argument applies. The latter case also explains in greater detail why the positionality 
effect unambiguously contributes to increase the marginal labor income tax rates if 
the low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker. 
 
Let us briefly discuss how the appearance of positional preferences may affect the 
marginal labor income tax rates according to the empirical evidence described above. 
Consider first the high-ability type, who would most likely (see Stiglitz 1982) face a 
negative marginal labor income tax rate in the absence of relative consumption 
concerns. To exemplify, suppose that 
2 0.1 t σ = −  and  0 t Γ = . The latter is motivated 
by the lack of empirical evidence of positionaility differences due to differences in 
leisure (remember that the mimicker and the low-ability type have the same 
consumption levels). In this case, if  0.5 t α =  (roughly consistent with Alpizar et al. 
2005 and Carlsson et al. 2007), then the marginal labor income tax rate facing the 
high-ability type is 0.45, whereas  0.8 t α =  (more in line with Easterlin 1995 and 
Luttmer 2005) implies a marginal labor income tax rate of 0.78. These are clearly 
very dramatic differences compared to the negative rate of -0.1 that would apply in 
the absence of positional preferences.
 12 For the low-ability type, the same 
assumptions would imply corresponding effects, although the changes in relative 
terms would seem less dramatic since the pure self-selection component,
1
t σ , is most 
likely positive (see above and Stiglitz 1982).  
 
4.2 Capital Income Taxation 
                                                 
12 Similarly, with fixed before-tax wage rates so that 
2 0 t σ = , the corresponding marginal labor 
income tax rates for the high-ability type are 0.5 and 0.8. 
   21
 
Let us now turn to the marginal capital income tax structure. Define the marginal rate 













and similarly for the mimicker. The marginal capital income tax rate for the low-
ability type can be derived by combining equations (9), (A2), (A3), and (A7), whereas 
the marginal capital income tax rate for the high-ability type can be derived by 
combining equations (9), (A5), (A6), and (A7). We show in the appendix that the 
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.   (22) 
 
Let us start by discussing the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type. 
Note that the first row is due to the appearance of the self-selection constraints. The 
first term reflects the self-selection constraint in period t. It means that if the relative 
valuation of current consumption by the low-ability type exceeds (falls short of) the 
relative valuation by the mimicker, there is an incentive for the government to 
stimulate (discourage) the current consumption via a higher (lower) marginal capital 
income tax rate. As such, this incentive effect serves to relax the self-selection 
constraint by making mimicking less attractive. There is a similar purpose behind the 
second term in the first row, although this effect is associated with the self-selection 
constraint in period t+1. It arises here because the savings in period t determine the 
capital stock in period t+1. If an increase in the capital stock increases (decreases) the 
wage ratio, then mimicking becomes less (more) attractive, providing an incentive for   22
the government to stimulate (discourage) savings by choosing a lower (higher) 
marginal capital income tax rate than it would otherwise have done. Note also that the 
first row of the formula for the high-ability type is analogous to, and has the same 
interpretation as, the second term in the first row of the formula for the low-ability 
type. These effects are well understood from earlier research (Brett 1997; Pirttilä and 
Tuomala 2001). 
 
The second row of each tax formula is novel and refers to the assumption that the 
private consumption good is, in part, a positional good. As the marginal capital 
income tax rates reflect a desired tradeoff between present and future consumption, 
each such term is decomposable into two parts. The intuition is, of course, that each 
individual values relative consumption both when young and old. By combining 
Lemma 1 with equations (21) and (22), we can derive the following result: 
 
Proposition 3. If the young and old low-ability type, respectively, is at least as 
positional as the corresponding mimicker in periods t and t+1, then the positionality 
effect in period t,  t £/ c 0 ∂ ∂<, contributes to decrease the marginal capital income tax 
rates in period t+1, whereas the positionality effect in period t+1,  t+1 £/ c 0 ∂∂ <, 
contributes to increase the marginal capital income tax rates in period t+1, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is straightforward. The positionality effect in 
period t means that an increase in the reference consumption in period t gives rise to a 
welfare loss. This provides an incentive for the government to choose lower marginal 
capital income tax rates than it would otherwise have done, which in turn stimulates 
savings and discourages consumption in period t. By analogy, the positionality effect 
in period t+1 means that an increase in the reference consumption in period t+1 
results in a welfare loss. As a consequence, there is an incentive for the government to 
reduce the average consumption in period t+1, which means that the government 
chooses higher marginal capital income tax rates than it would otherwise have done. 
The relative sizes of these two effects determine whether the appearance of positional 
preferences constitutes an incentive to tax or subsidize the capital income at the 
margin, ceteris paribus.   23
 
So far, we have not used the decomposition of the positionality effect given by 
equation (17). In general, since two such effects are involved, this decomposition does 
not give results that are as easy to interpret as the corresponding expressions for the 
marginal labor income tax rates in Proposition 2. Nevertheless, it is instructive to 
combine equation (17) with equations (21) and (22) in the special case where the 
degree of positionality does not vary over time. Consider Proposition 4: 
 
Proposition 4.  If the average degree of positionality as well as the positionality 
differences between the mimicker and the low-ability type remain constant over time, 
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Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Two aspects of Proposition 4 are worth emphasizing: First, there is no direct effect of 
positionality in the tax formulas. Second, there is no need to modify the effects of the 
self-selection constraint that are common in the two tax formulas (the term associated 
with the wage distribution). Therefore, in this special case, the appearance of 
positionality does not change the way in which we measure the marginal capital 
income tax rate of the high-ability type (compared with an economy without 
positional goods). The intuition is that under the conditions in the proposition, the 
current and future aspects of positionality cancel each other out to a large extent, 
suggesting that the incentives underlying capital formation are similar to those that 
would apply in economies without positional goods. However, this does not mean that 
the effect of positionality that still remains is unimportant. 
   24
Note that leisure is of course not generally weakly separable from private 
consumption. As a consequence, the low-ability type and the mimicker will differ 
with respect to the relative value attached to current consumption; the contribution of 
this difference to the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type is still 
affected by concern for positionality. To interpret the “positionality-weight” 
[1 ]/[1 ] α −− Γ , consider first the situation where 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
cx cx MRS MRS > , meaning that the 
first term on the right-hand side of equation (23) contributes to increase the marginal 
capital income tax rate of the low-ability type. As such, this term works to increase 
the current (first period) consumption of the low-ability type and, as a consequence, 
also the reference consumption in period t. The expression 1 α −  serves to modify this 
effect, as increased reference consumption gives rise to positional externalities. In 
other words, if we (for the moment) were to abstract from differences in the degree of 
positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type, implying that  0 Γ= , 
then the positionality-weight works to decrease the marginal capital income tax rate. 
This effect is counteracted (further strengthened) by  0 Γ >  ( 0 < ), as increased 
reference consumption in this case relaxes (tightens) the self-selection constraint in 
period t. The interpretation is analogous if 
1, 2,
,, ˆ tt
cx cx MRS MRS < . 
 
Let us also discuss the marginal capital income tax rates in the light of the empirical 
evidence regarding relative consumption concerns described above. To simplify (as 
the appearance of positional preferences generally affects the structure of capital 
income taxation in a very complex way), we focus on the case illustrated in 
Proposition 4, in which positional concerns only affect the marginal capital income 
tax rate of the low-ability type. As with the marginal labor income tax rates, we 
concentrate the discussion on the contribution of the average degree of positionality 
by assuming that  0 Γ = ; the reason is again the lack of clear empirical evidence 
regarding differences in the degree of positionality across agent types. In this (highly 
simplified) case, equation (23) suggests that the absolute value of the marginal capital 
income tax rate may be substantially smaller than would be predicted in the absence 
of positional concerns. In fact, with the expression proportional to 1 α −  held   25
constant,
13 the positionality effect contributes to scale down the absolute value of the 
marginal capital income tax rate by a factor between 2 and 5. 
 
It is worth emphasizing once again that there is no direct effect of positionality in 
equations (23) and (24) that is independent of the self-selection constraint. The 
following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 4: 
 
Corollary 1.  Suppose that the average degree of positionality as well as the 
positionality differences between the mimicker and the low-ability type remain 
constant over time.  Then, if leisure is weakly separable from private consumption in 
the sense that 
,,
11 1 ( ( , ,,, ,) , , ,)
ii i ii c i x i
tt t t tttt t t t t Uq f c x G Gz G G + ++ =Δ Δ  describes the utility 
function, and the wage ratio is constant, then both marginal capital income tax rates 
are zero. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Note that while the function  ( )
i
t q ⋅  may still vary across ability-types, the function 
() t f ⋅  is the same for both ability-types. Although the above result is based on 
assumptions that may not seem entirely realistic, it is nevertheless interesting from the 
perspective of comparison with earlier literature. Corollary 1 implies that the 
important result derived by Ordover and Phelps (1979), for when capital income 
taxation is not needed, carries over to our more general case that includes relative 
consumption concerns.   
 
4.3 Public good provision 
 
Define the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption for 
ability type i, when young and old respectively, in period t as  
                                                 
13 In reality, positional concerns of course give rise to indirect effects on the other terms as well. 
Therefore, this discussion only refers to the direct influence of the positionality effect. 



























and similarly for the mimicker. To shorten the formulas to be derived, we shall also 
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for the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for the public good (measured as the 
marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private consumption) 
among those alive in period t and the difference in the marginal value attached to the 
public good between the mimicker and the low-ability type (measured both for the 
young and old) in period t, respectively. 
 
Consider first the special case with  1 ξ = , in which the state-variable public good is 
equivalent to an atemporal control (or flow) variable, i.e.  tt Gg = . We can then 


















 ,        (25) 
 
which is analogous to the formula for public provision derived in a static model by 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008). The right-hand side is the direct marginal 
cost of providing the public good, which is measured as the marginal rate of 
transformation between the public good and the private consumption good and is 
normalized to one. The left-hand side is interpretable as the marginal benefit of the 
public good adjusted for the influences of the self-selection constraint and positional 
                                                 
14 For thorough discussions of public good provision in economies with asymmetric information, 
although without relative consumption concerns, see Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and Keen 
(1993).   27
preferences, respectively. The main differences between a static model and the 
intertemporal model analyzed here are that the self-selection effect and the 
positionality effect relevant for public provision in period t reflect the incentives 
facing generations t and t-1, as the high-ability type in each of these generations may 
act as a mimicker in period t. Note also that if we combine Lemma 1 and equation 
(25), then the third term on the right-hand side is interpretable to mean that if the 
young and old low-ability type, respectively, in period t is at least as positional as the 
corresponding mimicker, so that  t £/ c 0 ∂ ∂<, then the positionality effect in period t 
contributes to increased provision of the public good. The intuition is, of course, that 
if the private consumption is associated with a positional externality whereas the 
public good is not, it is welfare improving to increase the public good beyond the 
level that would be chosen without this externality, i.e. beyond the level that would be 
chosen if  t £/ c 0 ∂∂=, ceteris paribus. The argument goes the other way around if 
t £/ c 0 ∂∂>, in which case the mimicker is more positional than the low-ability type 
and sufficiently so to offset the negative effect associated with the average degree of 
positionality. 
 
Let us then turn to the case with a state variable public good, i.e. where  1 ξ < . By 
solving the difference equation (A8) for  t μ , and then using  tt μ γ =  from equation 
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Equation (26) essentially combines the policy rule for a state-variable public good in 
an OLG model without positional preferences derived by Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), 
with the policy rule for a control-variable public good summarized by equation (25). 
Again, the right-hand side is the direct marginal cost of a small increase in the 
contribution to the public good in period t, which is measured as the marginal rate of 
transformation between the public good and the private consumption good, whereas 
the left-hand side measures the marginal benefit of an increase in the contribution to 
the public good in period t adjusted for the influences of the self-selection constraint   28
and positional preferences, respectively. Note that this measure of adjusted marginal 
benefit is intertemporal as an increase in t g , ceteris paribus, affects the utility of each 
ability-type, as well as the self-selection constraint and the welfare the government 
attaches to increased reference consumption, in all future periods. 
 
In order to express the optimality condition in terms of individual degrees of 
positionality, we can substitute equation (17) into equation (26) to obtain:  
  
Proposition 5. The optimal provision of the public good is given by 
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By analogy to the expressions for the marginal income tax rates analyzed above, 
Proposition 5 uses the decomposition of the positionality effect into the influences of 
the average degree of positionality and positionality differences between the mimicker 
and the low-ability type. The interesting aspect here is the implication of positional 
preferences as captured by (1 ) /(1 ) tt τ τ α ++ −Γ− , which is interpretable as the 
“positionality-weight” in period t τ + :  t τ α +  (the average degree of positionality) 
contributes to scale up the aggregate instantaneous marginal benefit and, therefore, 
increases the provision of the public good. The effect of  t τ + Γ  (the measure of 
differences in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability 
type) can be either positive or negative. Therefore, a sufficient (not necessary) 
condition for the positionality weight in period t τ +  to scale up the aggregate 
instantaneous marginal benefit of the public good in that period is that  0 t τ + Γ≤ , 
meaning that the low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker. We have 
more generally: 
 
Proposition 6. A neccessary and sufficient condition for the joint impact of present 
and future positionality effects to increase the contribution to the public good in 
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Hence, a sufficient condition is that the low-ability types are predominantly at least as 
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Note that even though the second condition in Proposition 5 is much stronger than the 
first, it still does not require the low-ability types to be at least as positional as the 
mimickers in all periods. 
 
Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), it is interesting to analyze 
whether there is some special case in which the second-best policy rule for the public 
good reduces to a first-best policy rule. To be able to address this issue more 
thoroughly, note first that individual benefits of the public good are measured by each 
individual’s marginal willingness to pay for a small increment, ceteris paribus, i.e. 
while holding everything else fixed. At the same time, increased public provision 
typically comes together with other changes, notably that one’s own as well as other 
people’s taxes or charges are increased. In one frequently used method, the contingent 
valuation method, it is typically recommended (see Arrow et al. 1993) that a realistic 
payment vehicle is used when asking people about their maximum willingness to pay. 
One commonly used payment vehicle is to ask subjects how they would vote in a 
referendum where everybody would have to pay a certain amount, the same for all, 
through increased taxes (or charges) for the improvement. In the standard case where 
people do not care about relative consumption, this formulation has no important 
theoretical implication. Here, however, it does. To see this, let us define the marginal 
rate of substitution between the public good and private consumption at any time, t, 
conditional on the requirement that 
i
tt cc −  and  11
i
tt x c + + −  remain constant, which 
would follow if the willingness to pay question were supplemented by the information 
that everybody has to pay the same amount for an incremental public good. With 
reference to equation (1), this measure of instantaneous marginal benefits can be 



























By using equations (5a) and (5b), we can write the original measures of instantaneous 





Gc t Gc MRS CMRS α =− ,                           (28) 
 
,, ,
,1 , (1 )
it ix it
Gx t Gx MRS CMRS α − =− .                           (29) 
 
The measure of aggregate instantaneous marginal benefits then becomes 
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is the (normalized) covariance between the degree of non-positionality, measured by 
1 t α − , and the marginal willingness to pay for the public good. 
  
By substituting equation (30) into equation (27), we obtain 
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We are then able to present the following result that explains the conditions under 
which an intertemporal analogue to the Samuelson rule applies: 
 
Proposition 7. If (i) the degree of positionality is the same for both ability-types in all 
periods, as both young and old, (ii) leisure is weakly separable from private and 
public consumption in the sense that the utility function can be written to read 
,,
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tt t t tttt t t Uq f c x G Gz ++ =Δ Δ  for all t, and (iii) the instantaneous marginal   31
willingness to pay for the public good is always measured by using a payment vehicle 
where all individuals living at the same time have to pay the same amount, then the 
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Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Given that all individuals living at the same time believe they have to pay the same 
amount at the margin (in which case there is no correlation between the marginal 
willingness to pay and the degree of positionality at the individual level), then a 
weighted sum over time of instantaneous marginal benefits should equal the marginal 
cost of an incremental public good. In other words, an intertemporal analogue to the 
traditional Samuelson rule applies. What is less clear, perhaps, is how we should 
apply this or any other policy rule in practice, as we would need information about the 
willingness to pay for the public good by future generations. However, before taking 
the discussion about implementation to any greater detail, it is important to know the 
point of departure. Note also that in the special case where  1 ξ = , i.e. the case where 
the public good is a flow variable, Proposition 7 implies that the conventional 
Samuelson rule holds for each moment in time. 
 
5. The general model with consumption comparisons over time 
 
The analysis carried out in earlier sections is based on the assumption that the only 
measure of reference consumption at the individual level, in any period, is based on 
the average consumption in that particular period. As mentioned in Section 2, 
although this idea accords well with earlier literature on public policy and positional 
preferences, it neglects the possibility that agents also compare their own current 
consumption with both their own past consumption and that of other people. In this 
section, we will present and analyze the more general model that takes such 
comparisons into account. In all other respects, we make the same assumptions, e.g. 
with respect to the production sector and available policy instruments, as in the 
previous sections.   32
 
Following Rayo and Becker (2007), we will here thus assume that people care about 
three different kinds of relative consumption: their own current consumption 
compared to: (i) the current average consumption when young and when old, i.e. 
i
tt cc −  and  11
i
tt x c ++ − ; (ii) their own consumption one period earlier, i.e.  1
ii
tt x c + − ; and 
(iii) the average consumption one period earlier when young and when old, i.e. 
1
i
tt cc − −  and  1
i
tt x c + − .
15 We can then rewrite equation (1) as follows: 
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The first line of equation (32) is expressed in terms of these five differences, as well 
as in terms of leisure and private and public consumption when young and old, 
respectively. However, since 
i
t c  and  1
i
t x +  are decision variables of the individual, we 
can without loss of generality rewrite this utility formulation as the ”reduced form” 
function on the second line,
16 although the partial derivatives will now have a more 
complex interpretation than on the first line. For example,  ,
i
tc v reflects both the direct 
utility effect of increased absolute consumption when young and the (presumably 
negative) utility effect due to lower relative consumption when old compared to when 
being young. The third line is a more general formulation that corresponds to the 
second line of equation (1).  
 
Therefore, the second line of equation (32) means that all results derived in Section 4 
will continue to hold when people also make comparisons with their own past 
consumption. The only difference is in terms of the interpretations, where for example 
people’s marginal willingness to pay for increased provision of the public good now 
takes into account that the money foregone will also change the reference 
                                                 
15 In Abel (1990), people also compare with the consumption level one period earlier. However, as 
Abel assumes that people are identical within each period, there is no point in distinguishing between 
the individual’s own earlier consumption and that of others.  
16 On the second line, the effect of  1
ii
tt x c + −  on utility is embedded in the effects of 
i
t c  and  1
i
t x + .   33
consumption in the next period (cf. Arrow and Dasgupta 2007). The same 
modification applies to the interpretations of the marginal rates of substitution 
underlying the marginal income tax structure. However, others’ past consumption 
will, of course, give rise to positional externalities. The definition of useful measures 
of this kind of positionality is the task to which we turn next. 
 
5.1 The degree of current versus intertemporal consumption positionality 
 
With equation (32) at our disposal, the concept of ”degree of positionality” can be 
given a broader interpretation than in Sections 2, 3, and 4, where the consumption 
comparisons only referred to other people’s current consumption. Equation (32) 
allows us to distinguish between the current and intertemporal degree of positionality. 
If we use the short notations 
, ic i




ttt x c + + Δ= −  (as we did before), and 








tt t x c δ + = − , we can 









































   
By analogy, we can define the degree of intertemporal consumption positionality 










































As before, the variable 
, ic
t α  is interpreted as reflecting the fraction of the overall 
utility increase from an additional dollar spent in period t, when young, that is due to 
the increased consumption relative to the average consumption in period t, whereas 
, ix
t α  can be given a similar interpretation when old in period t+1. Similarly, 
, ic
t β  and 
, ix
t β  reflect the fraction of the overall utility increase from an additional dollar spent 
in period t and t+1 (i.e. when young and old), respectively, that is due to the increased   34
consumption relative to other people’s past consumption. By analogy to the analysis 
carried out in previous sections, we assume (to begin with) that 
,,,, 0, , ,1
ic ix ic ix
tttt ααββ <<  for all t. The average degree of current consumption 
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Note that  t α  and  t β  are measured among those alive in period t. 
 
5.2 The generalized positionality effect 
 
Except that equation (1) is now replaced by equation (32), the Lagrangean takes the 
same general form as in Section 3. For the same reason as before, the derivative 
t £/ c ∂∂ plays a key role in the formulas for the marginal income tax rates and 
contribution to the public good in period t. However, since the positionality concept 
discussed here has an intertemporal dimension, equation (17) no longer applies. To 
see this more clearly, and by analogy to the analysis carried out in Section 4, let 
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represent differences in the current and intertemporal degree of positionality, 
respectively, between the mimicker and the low-ability type in period t. Then, by 
using the short notation 
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∂− ∑ ∏ .              (33) 
 
We will refer to equation (33) as the generalized positionality effect in period t, as it 
provides a generalization of equation (17). There are two important differences 
between equations (17) and (33): First, the effects of the average degree of 
positionality and differences in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and 
the low-ability type, respectively, can be decomposed into two parts – the first and 
second terms of equation (33) – as the utility function in equations (32) distinguishes 
between current and intertemporal positionality. Therefore, an increase in the 
reference consumption in period t, ceteris paribus, directly affects the young and the 
old generation in period t due to the comparison with other people’s current 
consumption (the first term), and also directly affects the young and old generations 
living in period t+1 due to the comparison with other people’s past consumption (the 
second term). Second, a change in the reference consumption in period t gives rise to 
an intertemporal chain reaction, which is captured by the remaining term of equation 
(33). The intuition is that the intertemporal aspect of the consumption comparisons, 
i.e. that other people’s past consumption affects the utility, means that the welfare 
effects of changes in the reference consumption are no longer time-separable (as they 
were in earlier sections). This is so because a change in the reference consumption 
today means behavioral adjustments in the future, which, in turn, influence the 
reference consumption relevant for future generations. The following results are 
analogous to the last part of Lemma 1: 
 
Lemma 2. If, from period t and onwards, the low-ability type is at least as positional 
as the mimicker on average in any of the following senses 
(i)  
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(ii)   tk tk α ++ Γ<  and  11 tk tk β ++ ++ Λ<   0 k ∀ ≥ , 
(iii)  0 tk + Γ<  and  1 0 tk ++ Λ<   0 k ∀ ≥ , 
then increased reference consumption in period t reduces the welfare.   36
 
Given the assumption that the individual degrees of positionality (both in the current 
and intertemporal dimensions) are always between zero and one, (i) gives a sufficient 
condition for when increased reference consumption in period t leads to lower 
welfare. Yet, analogous to Lemma 1, condition (i) is not necessary, because the 
measures of the average degrees of positionality contribute to lower welfare as well. 
Condition (ii) is not necessary either, since  £ t c ∂ ∂  can clearly be negative even if (ii) 
does not hold for some k. Note finally that condition (iii), which we refer to for its 
straightforward interpretation, is actually redundant since it implies condition (ii).    
 
5.3 General optimality results 
 
Let us next turn to the implications for the optimality tax and expenditure results of 
the more general setup. The main implication of the extension carried out in this 
section is that equation (33) replaces equation (17); therefore, the first-order 
conditions for the optimal tax and expenditure problem are still given by equations 
(A1)-(A9). It is straightforward to show that equations (18) and (19) still characterize 
the marginal labor income tax rates, equations (21) and (22) the marginal capital 
income tax rates, and equation (26) the provision of the public good. As a 
consequence, if we combine equations (18), (19), and (26) with Lemma 2, we obtain 
the following result: 
 
Proposition 8. If any of the conditions in Lemma 2 hold so that increased reference 
consumption leads to lower welfare, ceteris paribus, then the generalized positionality 
effect in period t contributes to increase the marginal labor income tax rates for both 
ability-types in period t. Furthermore, if Lemma 2 always applies (i.e. applies for all 
t) along the general equilibrium path, then the generalized positionality effects 
contribute to increase the provision of the public good in period t. 
 
The interpretation of Proposition 8 is straightforward. If the low-ability type is at least 
as positional as the mimicker on average, loosely speaking, and given the assumption 
that the individual degrees of positionality are always between zero and one, then the 
right-hand side of equation (33) is negative. The result then follows by recalling that   37
the generalized positionality effect in equation (33) replaces equation (17) in 
equations (18), (19), and (26), whereas the other terms remain as they were in Section 
4. In addition, and for reasons similar to those discussed above, positional preferences 
may affect the marginal capital income tax rates in either direction, although the 
mechanisms are considerably more complex here than in Section 4. 
 
5.4 Further results under more restrictive assumptions 
 
To gain further insight into the consequences of positional preferences, let us follow 
the approach in Section 4 by considering the special case where the degree of 
positionality is constant over time. Therefore, suppose that t α α = ,  t β β = ,  t Γ= Γ , 
and  t Λ= Λ  for all t. To simplify the calculations further (yet with little loss of 
generality), we also add the assumptions that the population is constant, that the wage 
ratio is fixed in each period (meaning that it does not change with the capital stock), 
and that the interest rate is fixed and equal to r; the latter implies from equation (A7) 
that /(1 )
k
tk t r γγ + =+ . In this case, equation (33) reduces to the geometric series 
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where in the last step we have implicitly assumed that  ( )( ) 01 1 r βα < <− + so that 
the series converges. Define next the average degree of total consumption 
positionality and the difference between the total degree of consumption positionality 




























.     (34)   38
 
Equation (34) is analogous to equation (17); the main difference is that the concept of 
positionality is broader here, as it reflects the current and intertemporal degrees of 
positionality (the latter was absent in equation (17)). With equation (34) at our 
disposal, analogues to several results derived earlier – with the same general 
interpretation as given before – will follow immediately. 
 
To see this, note that the marginal labor income tax structure takes the same form as 
in Proposition 2, 
 
 
'( ) [1 ] [1 ][1 ]
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,     (35) 
 
for i=1,2, with the same general interpretation as before. The generalized positionality 
effect contributes to increase the marginal labor income tax rates in period t if the 
low-ability type is at least as positional as the mimicker in the sense that  0 ϒ≤ ; 
however, note that this condition reflects the total degree of consumption positionality 
and not just the current degree as in Section 4. Similarly, the capital income tax 
structure is analogous to that in Proposition 4 (with the exception that the wage ratio 
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'2
11 () 0 tt t sr ++ Φ= .       (37) 
   
Therefore, the analogue to the result derived by Ordover and Phelps (1979) continues 
to apply here as well; if leisure is weakly separable from the other goods in the utility 
function (and since the wage ratio is constant by assumption), then the marginal 
capital income tax rate facing each ability-type is zero. In this case, the appearance of 
positional preferences does not lead to distortionary capital income taxation. The 
formula for optimal provision of the public good becomes 





















+Ω− = ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦ ∑ ,     (38) 
 
with the same general interpretation as in the context of Proposition 6. 
 
Note finally that our analysis also applies to another special case discussed by Rayo 
and Becker (2007); namely, when an increase in other people’s past consumption, 
ceteris paribus, leads to higher utility for the individual so that  0 β < . As long as 
/(1 ) (0,1) r αβ ≥+ ∈ , i.e.  (0,1) ρ ∈ , in which case equation (34) is well defined, all 
results discussed here have the same qualitative interpretations independently of 
whether an increase in other people’s past consumption leads to lower (as we assumed 




As far as we know, the present paper is the first to consider optimal nonlinear income 
taxation and public good provision in a second-best economy with asymmetric 
information, where people care about relative consumption, based on a dynamic 
(OLG) model. The model used is an extension of the standard optimal nonlinear 
income tax model with two ability-types. Our approach recognizes three mechanisms 
behind the positional concerns: each individual compares his/her current consumption 
with (i) his/her own past consumption, (ii) other people’s current consumption, and 
(iii) other people’s past consumption.  
 
We began by analyzing the simple case where the comparison with other people’s 
consumption is limited to their current consumption. This situation enabled us to 
derive several distinct results with respect to the consequences of positional 
preferences for the marginal income tax structure and public provision. Our results 
show that the more positional people are on average, ceteris paribus, the higher the 
marginal labor income tax rates. The intuition is that a higher marginal labor income 
tax rate reduces the hours of work and, therefore, the resources available for private 
consumption (if the public consumption is held constant). As a consequence, it also 
reduces the reference consumption by which people compare their own consumption.   40
However, the effect of positional preferences on the marginal labor income tax rates 
also depends on whether the (mimicked) low-ability type is more or less positional 
than the mimicker, as this will determine whether an increase or a decrease in the 
reference consumption works to relax the self-selection constraint. By using the 
(scarce) available empirical evidence, our model implies that the optimal marginal 
labor income tax rates are likely to be much higher than suggested by models without 
relative consumption comparisons. 
 
The effects of positional preferences on the marginal capital income tax rates are 
ambiguous in general. This also accords very well with intuition, as the marginal 
capital income tax rates reflect a tradeoff between present and future consumption, 
and the consumers are allowed to be positional in both periods. However, in the 
special case where the degree of positionality is constant over time and across agent-
types, plausible empirical estimates suggest that the marginal capital income tax rate 
of the low-ability type may be substantially smaller in absolute value than in the 
conventional optimal income tax model. In addition, if the degree of positionality is 
constant over time for all agent-types, we are able to reproduce the well-known result 
of Ordover and Phelps (1979), although the consumers have positional preferences in 
our framework; in other words, if leisure is weakly separable from the other goods in 
the utility function, and with constant relative wage rates, the marginal capital income 
tax rates should be zero. 
 
As the public good in our model is a state variable, the effects of positional 
preferences are more complex than in the static model analyzed by Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008). The reason is that the marginal benefit of an incremental 
contribution to the public good in period t is intertemporal (it reflects the present 
value of all future instantaneous marginal benefits), meaning that it is governed by the 
preferences of the current and all future generations. If an individual’s marginal 
willingness to pay for the public good is measured by holding the contributions made 
by others constant, it follows that the more positional people are on average now and 
in the future, ceteris paribus, the larger the optimal public provision compared to the 
case where relative consumption comparisons are absent. However, it matters also 
here (as it does for the marginal income tax structure) whether the low-ability type is 
more or less positional than the mimicker (both at present and in the future), as this   41
determines whether an incremental contribution to the public good in period t relaxes 
or tightens the self-selection constraint. By analogy to Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2008), it is shown here that the adjustment of the formula for public 
provision implied by relative consumption concerns depends on whether each 
individual’s marginal willingness to pay is elicited by holding everything else 
constant or by using a payment vehicle implying that each individual knows that other 
agents have to pay too. 
 
Adding the intertemporal aspects of relative consumption comparisons, i.e. that each 
individual also compares his/her current consumption with his/her own and others’ 
past consumption, gives a richer structure, as it enables us to distinguish between the 
current and intertemporal degrees of consumption positionality. It is first shown that 
comparisons with own past consumption do not affect the optimal policy rules, since 
such comparisons are internalized by each individual. However, comparisons with 
others’ past consumption complicate the analysis and the interpretations considerably, 
as the welfare effects of a change in the reference consumption in period t effectively 
become dependent on the preferences of all future generations. Still, we were able to 
show that for the special case where the degrees of (current and intertemporal) 
consumption positionality are constant over time, and with some additional 
assumptions, many of the results derived earlier in the paper carry over to this more 
general framework. More specifically, the appearance of positional preferences will 
affect the marginal income tax structure and public provision in the same general way 
as in the simpler model, with the exception that the positionality concept is broader in 
the sense that each individual also makes intertemporal consumption comparisons. In 
other words, the results referred to above – which were derived in a model without 
intertemporal consumption comparisons – will under certain conditions continue to 
apply in a framework where each individual also compares his/her current 
consumption with other people’s past consumption. 
 
Finally, although the present paper in several respects generalizes the literature on 
optimal taxation and public expenditures when relative consumption matters, there are 
still many important aspects left to explore. Examples include public provision of 
private goods, heterogeneous relative consumption concerns (e.g. that people may 
compare themselves more with their own ability-type), a multi-country setting, and   42
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first-order conditions of the firm. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1   43
From equation (1) we have that  ,,, t
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Corresponding expressions hold for the mimicker. By combining equations (17), 
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Substituting equations (A13)-(A16) and the definition of  t Γ  into equation (A12) gives 
equation (17). 
 
The Marginal Labor Income Tax Rates 
 
Consider the tax formula for the low-ability type. By combining equations (A1) and 
(A2), we obtain 
   44
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By substituting 
11 1 1 1 1
,, '( ) / tt t t tz t c Tw lw w u u =−  into equation (A8) and rearranging, we 
obtain equation (18). The marginal labor income tax rate of the high-ability type, 
equation (19), can be derived in a similar way. 
 
To derive equation (20), we combine equations (17) and (18) to obtain 
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Then, by using 
1, 1 1 1
, /1 ' ( )
t
zc t t t MRS w T w l =−  and rearranging, we obtain equation (20) for 
the low-ability type. The marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type can 
be derived in a similar way. 
 
The Marginal Capital Income Tax Rates 
 
Let us consider the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type. By 
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We then use equations (9) and (A7) to derive 
1, 1
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t
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111 1 , 1 11 (1 ) [ / ] tt t t t z t t t ru l K γγ λ φ +++ + + ++ =+ + ∂ ∂ , respectively. Substituting into equation 
(A19) and rearranging, we obtain equation (21). Equation (22) can be derived in a 
similar way. 
   45
To derive equations (23) and (24), let us substitute  t [£ /c ] / [ ] [ ] / [ 1 ] tt t t t N γ αα ∂ ∂= Γ − −  
as well as the corresponding expression for period t+1 into equations (21) and (22). 
We shall also use the short notations 
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to represent the self-selection terms in equations (21) and (22). The marginal capital 
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11 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 ˆ (1 ) / [ / ] [ / ] tt t t t t x t tt ru l K γγ λ γ φ ++ + + + + + + +− = − ∂∂  into equation 
(A21) and using the definition of 
i
t δ , we obtain equations (23) and (24). 
 
The proof of Corollary 1 follows from acknowledging that the mimicker and the low-
ability type differ only with respect to preferences and the use of leisure. Given the 
separability assumption, and that the consumers share a common sub-utility function   46
() t f ⋅ , it follows that 
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cx cx MRS MRS = . In addition, a constant wage ratio implies that 
11 /0 tt K φ ++ ∂∂= . These conditions substituted into equations (23) and (24) imply 
Corollary 1.  
 
Public Good Provision 
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By solving equation (A23) for  t μ , and then using  tt μ γ =  from equation (A9), we 
obtain equation (26).  
 
Proposition 7 follows directly from equation (33). Since  () t f ⋅ is the same for both 
ability-types, and the mimicker has the same absolute as well as relative consumption 
as the low-ability type, it follows that
2, 1,
,, ˆ tt
Gc Gc MRS MRS =  and 
2, 1,
,, ˆ tt
Gx Gx MRS MRS =  so that 
0 t Ω= . It also follows that 
2, 1, ˆ
cc
tt α α =  and 
2, 1, ˆ
x x
tt α α =  so that  0 t Γ = . Note also that, 
although the function  () f ⋅  is the same for both ability-types, the function  ( )
i q ⋅  can 
still vary between agents. Furthermore, by assuming that the degree of positionality is 
the same for both ability-types, we have  0 Ψ = . Substituting  0 t Ω = , 0 t Γ= , and 
0 Ψ= into equation (33) implies Proposition 7. 
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The generalized positionality effect 
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which substituted into equation (A25) imply 
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the recursive equation (A30) can more conveniently be rewritten and expanded as 
follows: 
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Substituting back ( ) 1 1 tt t ϕβ α + =−  into equation (A31) implies equation (33). 
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